PRIDE is one of the most efficient lightweight block cipher proposed so far for connected objects with high performance and lowresource constraints. In this paper we describe the first ever complete Differential Fault Analysis against PRIDE. We describe how fault attacks can be used against implementations of PRIDE to recover the entire encryption key. Our attack has been validated first through simulations, and then in practice on a software implementation of PRIDE running on a device that could typically be used in IoT devices. Faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the PRIDE execution and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key bits. We also discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks.
Introduction
With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), new cryptographic primitives are needed to suit the high performance, low power and low resource constraints of IoT devices. Ciphers like AES, which are good enough for devices like smart cards, do not satisfy the constraints of devices like RFID tags or nodes in sensor networks. During the past years, several lightweight block ciphers have been proposed, like for example PRESENT [10] , PRINCE [12] , SIMON [6] or SPECK [6] . Among those, the NSA proposal SPECK is a highly efficient software-oriented cipher, but it does not have any 'linear diffusion layer' implying that it requires a huge number of rounds to guarantee an appropriate security level. In order to keep a small number of rounds, the PRIDE cipher [4] exploits an optimal linear layer which provides a high diffusion and has highly efficient implementations. Although hardware implementations are more efficient in terms of clock cycles than software implementations, design and study of software-oriented ciphers is nevertheless important since these implementations are used in practice because they are less expensive and more flexible than hardware implementations. To date, when looking at software implementations, PRIDE is one of the most efficient lightweight cryptographic ciphers as shown the performance comparisons given in [4, 5] . This led us to study the security provided by PRIDE and its resistance to malicious attacks. In terms of security, two of the differential attacks proposed so far in the literature do not allow to recover the entire key [37, 38] , while a third one [14] does achieve this but under stringent conditions. Since PRIDE is to be used in IoT devices in pervasive environments, we ought to also look at implementation-related issues. In that respect, we propose in this paper the first Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) on PRIDE. DFA is a particular physical attack, in which we compare the results of a correct computation to one which has been disturbed at a precise time, in order to infer information about the key bits used in the algorithm. It is closely related to differential cryptanalysis, but much more efficient since it exploits differential characteristics on very few rounds only.
In this paper, we first present PRIDE before describing the theoretical DFA using different fault models. Then we validate our hypotheses and equations using data onto which fault models have been 'simulated'. In order to validate the practical feasibility of our attack, we used electromagnetic pulses to inject faults during the execution of the PRIDE cipher running on an off-the-shelf chip embedding an ARM Cortex-M3 micro-controller and applied our DFA on the corrupted results obtained. So as to taking advantage of the 32-bit architecture of the micro-controller, we have implemented PRIDE in ARM assembly language. Thereby, we show the practical feasibility of our attack from 32-bit random faults. Finally we discuss countermeasures that can be implemented to thwart such attacks before concluding the paper with some perspectives.
2 Fault attacks against cryptographic algorithms
Physical attacks
Unlike mathematical attacks which target the actual definition of a cryptographic cipher, physical attacks target the way the cipher is implemented. Physical attacks can be divided into two categories: invasive and non-invasive ones. In this paper, we further focus on non-invasive techniques which mainly consist either in analysing side-channel information leakages or in injecting faults during a cryptographic computation.
Side-Channel Analyses [23] , [27] exploit the fact that some physical values or "side channels" such as the power consumption [22] , the electromagnetic radiation [17] , [31] or the calculation time [16] , [21] of an integrated circuit depend on the operations and data manipulated during a given computation. Information about the internal processes of the chip and the data it is manipulating can be derived by observing such external physical characteristics. Such analyses can be quickly mounted with cheap equipment, without altering the physical integrity of the circuit. This dependency between the side channels and the internal computations can be analysed to infer information about the data manipulated using mathematical tools like correlation [13] , mutual information [18] , variance [25] or entropy [26] or using architecture-dependant behaviours such as cache accesses [7] , [29, 30] or using branch predictions [2, 1] .
Fault attacks
Fault Attacks, introduced in [11] , consist in disturbing the behaviour of the circuit in order to alter the correct progress of the cipher. The faults are injected into the device by various means such as light pulses [34] , laser [33] , clock glitches [3] , spikes on the voltage supply [9] or electromagnetic (EM) perturbations [15] . Some of those techniques, like the one using a laser, are invasive requiring the "decapsulation" of the chip using mechanical or chemical means. Laser allows to target one bit in a given register if well manipulated. However it is a very costly means of injection. Other techniques are not invasive such as glitches (power, clock, electromagnetic). Clock and voltage glitches disturb the whole component, and many injections have to be made before getting the faults required by theoretical attacks. EM glitches on the other hand allow to have relatively high spatial and temporal precisions using equipment at "affordable costs" [15] .
One of the objectives of fault attacks, especially when considering cryptographic ciphers, is to perform Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). DFA, originally described in [8] , consists in retrieving a cryptographic key by comparing the correct ciphertexts with the faulty ones. DFA techniques have been described and applied to most publicly known cryptographic ciphers going from symmetrickey algorithms like the DES [8] or the AES [32] to asymmetric algorithms like RSA [11] or even more complex schemes like pairing-based cryptography [24] . In the particular field of lightweight cryptography, differential fault attacks have been proposed against ciphers like PRESENT [39] (used in conjunction with a cube attack), SPECK [36] (although about a hundred faults are needed which is way more than usual), TRIVIUM [28] or PRINCE [35] . The latter PRINCE block cipher has an SPN structure similar to PRIDE and in that respect the DFA proposed in [35] is quite similar to the one proposed hereafter: in our case the attack is not only adapted to the PRIDE cipher but has also been validated in practice on an embedded device running PRIDE.
DFA techniques are very efficient in retrieving the keys used during a cryptographic computation, usually requiring a few executions only. It is also quite complex to devise countermeasures against such attacks because of the diversity of the possible injection methods and because the usually deployed countermeasures (like redundancy, error-correcting codes etc) have serious impacts on the performance of the targeted cryptographic cipher. For all those reasons, in our approach of analysing the security of implementations of PRIDE, we decided to first focus on its resistance against fault attacks in order to identify possible attack paths and devise the most efficient countermeasures in order to keep the high performance characteristics of the original cipher. last 64 bits k 1 are used by a key schedule to produce the subkeys f r (k 1 ) for each round r. The key schedule simply adds round-constants to parts of the key.
We denote k 1i the i-th byte of k 1 then
for round r with
In this paper, X[n] denotes the n-th nibble (4 bits) of a binary word X while X{b} denotes its b-th bit. Moreover, the bits and nibbles are numbered from left to right starting from 0. The following notation is used for the intermediate values of the state within the round function R of PRIDE (see Figure 2 ): I r the input of the r-th round X r the state after the key addition layer of the r-th round Y r the state after the substitution layer of the r-th round input Z r the state after the permutation layer of the r-th round W r the state after the matrix layer of the r-th round O r the output of the r-th round
The r-th round, 1 ≤ r ≤ 19, of PRIDE is then composed of the following steps (see Figure 2 ). i. Apply the inverse permutation layer P −1 given in [4] to f r (k 1 ) and XOR the permuted round subkey to the input state: X r = I r ⊕ P −1 (f r (k 1 )), ii. Apply the S-box S given in Table 1 to each of the 16 nibbles of X r (i.e. apply the substitution layer S−layer to X r ): Y r = S−layer(X r ), iii. Apply the permutation layer P to Y r :
. . .
 by L i given in [4] for i ∈ {0, · · · , 3}:
v. Apply the inverse permutation P −1 to W r : O r = P −1 (W r ). Table 1 : S-box of the block cipher PRIDE x 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7 0x8 0x9 0xa 0xb 0xc 0xd 0xe 0xf S(x) 0x0 0x4 0x8 0xf 0x1 0x5 0xe 0x9 0x2 0x7 0xa 0xc 0xb 0xd 0x6 0x3
For the final round, denoted by R , only the first two steps are applied.
In order to encrypt a plaintext M , the cipher applies P −1 to M , then performs an XOR between the result and k 0 . It then applies the 20 rounds as previously described and performs again an XOR with k 0 . Finally, P is applied to the result to obtain the ciphertext C. Figure 1 shows the general structure of PRIDE. In this section, we present a technique adapted from the proposed attack in [35] to retrieve the secret key using fault injections on PRIDE computations. The aim of our analysis is to minimize the number of fault injections needed. We use ideal fault models and we describe how to exploit them to retrieve the key.
General principle
Despite their similarities, a DFA is different from a classical differential analysis. Indeed, for the latter, the differences must be injected on the input of the cipher while for a DFA they can be injected at the moments where the attacker wants.
The DFA that we propose in this paper also differs from most classical DFA since it is not based on statistical methods: it is deterministic. The attack is composed of two stages, one consists in corrupting data manipulated in the penultimate round to retrieve k 0 and the other in attacking the antepenultimate round to retrieve k 1 . The general structure of the attack is to exploit the diffusion of a 16-bit word within the inverse permutation layer in order to get a known 4-bit difference at the input of each S-box on the following round. Together with the knowledge of the output difference of each S-box, which are derived from the correct and faulty ciphertexts, C and C * , this allows us to retrieve information about the key. To this end, we exploit the difference distribution table of the PRIDE S-box given in Appendix A. Indeed, obtaining information on k 0 is possible from the following equation:
where S−layer = S−layer −1 denotes the substitution layer. We can use this equation for each nibble 0 ≤ i ≤ 15:
From the knowledge of a nonzero input difference ∆Y 20 [i] and of an output difference ∆X 20 [i] for S −1 , we deduce 2 or 4 candidates for the input value x, because the differential uniformity of S −1 equals 4 (see the difference distribution table in Appendix A). Moreover, Proposition 1 enables us to exhibit pairs of differentials for the S-box which are simultaneously satisfied for a single element. The proof to this proposition is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Let S be an n-bit S-box with differential uniformity 4. Let (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) be two differentials with a 1 = a 2 such that the system of two equations
has at least two solutions. Then, each of the three equations (1), (2) and
has at least four solutions.
In other words, if we can find two differentials (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) such that one out of the three entries in the difference distribution table (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) and (a 1 ⊕ a 2 , b 1 ⊕ b 2 ) equals to 2, then we can guarantee that the input satisfying these two differentials simultaneously is unique.
Note: if one of the three equations does not have any solution, then the system of two equations (1) and (2) does not have any solution neither.
Once k 0 has been recovered (we will see in the next parts some strategies to achieve this end), X 20 and X * 20 can be computed from the ciphertexts C and C * . Let L denote the whole linear layer, i.e.,
Then ∆Y 19 can be computed and the following equation
allows the attacker to recover P −1 (f 20 (k 1 )) and therefore k 1 , with the same method but from fault injections in the 18-th round. Indeed, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15:
Ideal fault model
The strategies we propose require at least 2 fault injections for each stage of the attack to retrieve a round key (i.e 4 to retrieve the complete key). For the first stage, whose objective is to find k 0 , one of the following approaches can be used:
, where Z i r (resp. W i r ) denotes the input (resp. output) of the matrix L i at round r. Then, to retrieve the key k 1 , and so the complete key, the possible fault injections are the same but are carried out on Z 18 or W 18 . A flip of Z 0 r gives us a difference equal to 0xffff on the input of the matrix L 0 . The matrix being linear, we know that the output difference is also 0xffff. The latter being the same value than the one obtained with a flip of W 0 r . The other matrices have differences in input and output equal to zero. Then, the inverse permutation layer also being linear, we know the input difference of each S-box of the substitution layer at round r + 1. These values are equal to 0x8, so we obtain ∆X r+1 [i] = 0x8 for all i ∈ {0, · · · , 15}. Moreover, we recall that the output differences are known from the correct and faulty ciphertexts. Figure 3 shows the propagation of the difference (displayed in red) obtained by a flip of Z 0 19 . In the same way, a flip of Z 3 r or W 3 r yields a difference of 0x1 on each S-box at round r + 1. Finally, with strategy (i.) or (ii.), we obtain pairs of differentials (∆Y 20 
with a 1 and a 2 known. We get the same pairs for (∆Y 19 [i], ∆X 19 [i]) from faults on the 18-th round. Since 0x1⊕0x8 = 0x9, from the Proposition 1 (and the difference distribution table in Appendix A), 
. there is only one element in the intersection of the two sets of solutions obtained for each nibble. Therefore, we have shown that we get only one candidate for each nibble of x = P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 from faults on the 19-th round and one candidate for each nibble of
Finally, from the knowledge of C we retrieve k 0 and from the key schedule we retrieve k 1 . The strategies we have presented require 4 fault injections to retrieve the complete key. In case the attacker obtains fewer faults, Table 2 shows the time complexity, expressed as a number of encryptions, that an attacker can obtain to retrieve the secret key k with 1 to 3 faults following the ideal fault model. A proof of these values is given in Appendix B. 
Random fault model
In order to achieve the attack, we must flip all the bits of four 16-bit words for the ideal fault model used in the preceding part. However, we can see that reversing one bit provides an active S-box, it is therefore enough to inverse all the bits of the desired 16-bit words. Indeed, if we flip the bit i of W 0 19 from one fault, we obtain 4 candidates for the nibble i of the subkey k 0 . Moreover, if we flip the bit i of W 3 19 from an other fault, we retrieve (by intersection) the value of the nibble i of k 0 .
It is easy to target a specific instruction from a simple power (or EM) analysis for example in practice. If the instruction is less than 16 bits, we can then reduce the key space from each active S-box, until it is enough small for an exhaustive search. Finally, we will see in the section 5 that the attack is still effective from 32-bit faults, only the exploitation of the faults is different.
Properties exploited by our attack
Our attack mainly exploits two properties of the building-blocks of PRIDE:
The design of the linear layer based on the so-called interleaved construction. Indeed, this construction aims at designing a diffusion layer with a high branch number (see Theorem 1 in [4] ). For a SPN whose substitution layer is composed of n S-boxes over F k 2 , the linear layer obtained by the interleaved construction is defined as
Then, we deduce from the definition of P that flipping the n bits of any word at the input of P −1 in W = (W 1 , · · · , W k ) activates all S-boxes in the next round. Indeed, by construction, the n bits of any W i go to different S-boxes. Hence flipping n consecutive bits in the linear layer of the penultimate round allows the attacker to recover information on all the n nibbles of the subkey used in the last round. The number of candidates for this last-round subkey is upper-bounded by δ(S) n , where δ(S) is the differential-uniformity of the S-box (δ(S) = 4 in the case of PRIDE and of most block ciphers using 4-bit S-boxes).
The differential properties of the S-box, which avoids the existence of differentials with high probability over a large number of rounds. The counterpart of this resistance against classical differential cryptanalysis is that the number of inputs which satisfy two valid differentials simultaneously is usually reduced to a single element. This property enables the attacker to drastically reduce the number of subkey candidates. In the case of PRIDE, two faults, each on n consecutive bits in the linear layer, are enough to obtain a single candidate for the subkey.
Simulation of the DFA on PRIDE
In order to validate our theoretical DFA against PRIDE and test the correctness of the proposed equations, we first performed a validation by simulation.
In this section we assume that a device executes PRIDE with a key k = k 0 ||k 1 where k 0 = 0xefcdab8967452301 and k 1 = 0x0123456789abcdef. We further assume that an attacker successfully flips all the bits of Z The knowledge of the plaintext is not necessary, it is sufficient to ensure that the same plaintext is used for each execution. 7 The attacker obtains the following differentials for the last substitution layer from the first two faulty ciphertexts:
From the first differential, she obtains a set of candidates for each nibble of P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 where C is the correct ciphertext. She can then find a set of candidates for each nibble of k 0 from P −1 (C) = 0xab720c373416ba8d. Table 3 shows the obtained sets of candidates. [3] k0 [4] k0 [5] k0 [6] k0 [7] k0 [8] k0 [9] k0 [10] k0 [11] k0 [12] k0 [13] k0 [14] k0 [15] 0x5 0x4 0x4 0x5 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x1 0x5 0x5 0x4 0x5 0x0 0x1 0x0 0x1 0x6 0x7 0x6 0x6 0x2 0x3 0x2 0x2 0x6 0x7 0x7 0x7 0x2 0x3 0x2 0x2 0xd 0xc 0xc 0xd 0x8 0x8 0x8 0x9 0xd 0xd 0xc 0xd 0x8 0x9 0x8 0x9 0xe 0xf 0xe 0xe 0xa 0xb 0xa 0xa 0xe 0xf 0xf 0xf 0xa 0xb 0xa 0xa
From the last differential, the attacker obtains another set of candidates for each nibble of k 0 . Table 4 shows the resulting candidates. [3] k0 [4] k0 [5] k0 [6] k0 [7] k0 [8] k0 [9] k0 [10] k0 [11] k0 [12] k0 [13] k0 [14] k0 [15] 0xa 0xa 0xa 0xa 0xa 0xa 0x8 0x8 0x2 0x2 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x2 0x0 0x0 0xb 0xb 0xb 0xb 0xb 0xb 0x9 0x9 0x3 0x3 0x1 0x1 0x3 0x3 0x1 0x1 0xe 0xe 0xc 0xc 0xc 0xe 0xe 0xe 0x6 0x6 0x4 0x4 0x4 0x4 0x6 0x6 0xf 0xf 0xd 0xd 0xd 0xf 0xf 0xf 0x7 0x7 0x5 0x5 0x5 0x5 0x7 0x7
By doing the intersection of the obtained two sets for each nibble, the attacker gets k 0 . Then, with this value of k 0 , she obtains the following differences for the antepenultimate substitution layer from the flip of W 0 18 and W 3 18 :
From the first differential, she obtains sets of candidates for each nibble Nib i of L −1 (S(P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 ) ⊕ P −1 (f 20 (k 1 ))) with i ∈ {0, · · · , 15}. Table 5 shows the sets of candidates she gets. Nib0 Nib1 Nib2 Nib3 Nib4 Nib5 Nib6 Nib7 Nib8 Nib9 Nib10 Nib11 Nib12 Nib13 Nib14 Nib15 0x0 0x4 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x5 0x5 0x4 0x4 0x5 0x5 0x4 0x0 0x5 0x0 0x5 0x2 0x7 0x3 0x2 0x2 0x6 0x6 0x7 0x7 0x6 0x6 0x7 0x2 0x6 0x2 0x6 0x8 0xc 0x9 0x8 0x8 0xd 0xd 0xc 0xc 0xd 0xd 0xc 0x8 0xd 0x8 0xd 0xa 0xf 0xb 0xa 0xa 0xe 0xe 0xf 0xf 0xe 0xe 0xf 0xa 0xe 0xa 0xe From the last differential, the attacker obtains other sets of candidates for each nibble Nib i of L −1 (S(P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 ) ⊕ P −1 (f 20 (k 1 ))) with i ∈ {0, · · · , 15}. Table 6 shows the sets of candidates obtained. Nib0 Nib1 Nib2 Nib3 Nib4 Nib5 Nib6 Nib7 Nib8 Nib9 Nib10 Nib11 Nib12 Nib13 Nib14 Nib15 0x8 0x8 0x8 0x8 0x0 0x2 0xa 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x8 0x8 0xa 0x0 0x8 0xa 0x9 0x9 0x9 0x9 0x1 0x3 0xb 0x1 0x9 0x1 0x9 0x9 0xb 0x1 0x9 0xb 0xe 0xe 0xe 0xe 0x4 0x6 0xc 0x4 0xe 0x4 0xe 0xe 0xc 0x4 0xe 0xc 0xf 0xf 0xf 0xf 0x5 0x7 0xd 0x5 0xf 0x5 0xf 0xf 0xd 0x5 0xf 0xd
By intersecting the obtained two sets for each nibble, the attacker gets
Then, she computes
and from S(P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 ) = 0x11c3a9c65f5f772b, she retrieves P −1 (f 20 (k 1 )) = 0x3500350f27ab6aff.
Finally she deduces f 20 (k 1 ) = 0x0137454b89ffcd53, she gets k 1 from the key scheduling and so she retrieves the complete key.
Practical implementation of the DFA on PRIDE
In order to test the feasibility of our attack against the PRIDE block cipher, we have implemented and run the cipher on an STM32 chip embedding an ARM Cortex-M3 micro-controller. That particular chip was chosen because it is quite representative of the off-the-shelf devices used for IoT applications. Note that the chip does not embed any countermeasures against the kind of the fault attacks implemented in this paper. We validated the attack on an implementation in ARM assembly language taking advantage of the 32-bit architecture of the micro-controller. We present in this section the full analysis conducted on this implementation. The source code is given in Appendix C and Table 7 compares the performances of this implementation with that of the implementation in AVR assembly language whose source code and performances are given in [4] .
So as to inject exploitable faults into such a chip, we used EM pulses because with this approach we did not need to decapsulate the chip and we were able to inject faults at precise enough instants to target specific instructions of the cipher during its execution. The set-up we used is quite similar to the one described in [15] , with the difference that we did not need any motorized X-Y stage: injecting faults 'in the center' of the chip was good enough for having a fault model close to a random fault model (one chance over two to flip a bit). Indeed, it is possible to target a precise 32-bit word (more precisely a specific instruction) but the injected faults follow a random pattern. In order to obtain pairs of differentials (∆X 20 [i], ∆Y 20 [i]) (resp. (∆X 19 [i], ∆Y 19 [i])) for i ∈ {0, · · · , 15}, we injected the faults on the first and on the second 32-bit word of the state before the inverse permutation in the 19-th (resp. 18-th) round. by as many faults as necessary. Each fault on the first word provided us differences on each nibble of ∆X 20 equal to 0x0, 0x4, 0x8 or 0xc and equal to 0x0, 0x1, 0x2 or 0x3 from each fault on the second word. We validated the attack from these 32-bit faults, we will see that the faults exploitation is different (some pairs of differentials do not allow us a single candidate) but the attack is nevertheless still effective.
In our experiment, we used a key k = k 0 ||k 1 where k 0 = 0xf3f721cb1c882658 and k 1 = 0xe417d148e239ca5d. The plaintext used for all executions was 0x0132546 798badcfe and the correct ciphertext was 0x9aecb37ea45a6c89. We used a simple EM analysis to identify in time the 18-th and 19-th rounds. Figure 4 shows the curve obtained on the oscilloscope, the 20 rounds are displayed in red.
Figure 4: EM curve measured of PRIDE cipher
Then we used an electromagnetic pulse generator to disrupt the PRIDE's execution. 19 ), only obtained from the correct and the faulty ciphertexts. We denote respectively by θ, β, γ, δ the possible pair of values (0x2,0x3), (0x4,0x8), (0x4,0xc), (0x8,0xc). Indeed, some differences in output of the S-boxes can be obtained from two distinct differences in input. Finally, we give in each table the fault value computed after retrieving the key. Value of ∆Y20 Value of ∆X20 1 0x1aad3b972c92ec09 0x00000000804108e8 0xf00060007e40600c 0xθ00010001θ10100θ 2 0x7b4c93dea55a6d89 0x00000000e1a0a0a0 0x88c0000bc0c00000 0xθθθ0000θθ0θ00000 3 0x1b6c733e255aadc9 0x0000000081804040 0xf500000b85000000 0xθ100000θθ1000000 4 0x71ecd27ee55a6d89 0x00000000eb00e900 0x8ec0808f00000000 0xθθθ0θ0θθ00000000 5 0x9aecb324a4426cdb 0x000000000000005a 0x0000000005076050 0x0000000001011010 6 0x9a57b33fa4626cf1 0x0000000000bb005a 0x0000000085bbb08c 0x00000000θ1θθθ0θθ 7 0x9a57b365a4606cb9 0x0000000000bb0000 0x0000000080bfe0ec 0x00000000θ0θθθ0θθ 8 0x77aa24313111ed8c 0x00000000ed461f4d 0xf8868e4f0e006de7 0xθθθ1θθ1θ0θ001θθ1 9 0x9ae8b37ac15a6989 0x6500040400000000 0x0220030300000c00 0x0δδ00δ0δ00000γ00 10 0x8aecb27e415abc89 0xe400d10000000000 0x3329020600000000 0xδδδγ0δ0400000000 11 0xa3e692ed909ee688 0x355fab9300000000 0x10ea921c620482c5 0x40cβγδ4γ4δ0c8δγc 12 0x05ecb27e565a7289 0xf3001f0000000000 0xa22b99bc00000000 0xβδδcγγcγ00000000
Note: Out of 2,000 shots, we don't get any cipher for 1,219 cases and we get 247 faulty ciphers including 13 exploitable (i.e. which satisfied the conditions for our DFA). Non exploitable faulty ciphers came from a dysfunction of the UART due to the faults. We now give, among the obtained faults, those that give as much information as all faults and all sets of candidates that we can extract from each fault. Table 10 shows all sets of candidates obtained for each nibble of k 0 from the differentials (∆Y 20 , ∆X 20 ) and from P −1 (C) = 0xe17c93c49ec6fc61 with C the correct ciphertext. Symbol ∅ means that the fault does not provide any information about the nibble (i.e. the 16 values are possible).
We eventually get 4 possible values for k 0 with k 0 [8] ∈ {0x0, 0x1} and k 0 [10] ∈ {0x8, 0x9}. In order to reduce the number of possible keys, we then used faulty ciphers obtained from fault injection on the 18-th round. For this, we compute the difference output ∆Y 19 from the remaining 4 candidates for the key. Then we can observe that some differentials (∆X 19 , ∆Y 19 ) are not possible and therefore remove the corresponding candidate. No. k0[0] k0 [1] k0 [2] k0 [3] k0 [4] k0 [5] k0 [6] k0 [7] k0 [8] k0 [9] k0 [10] k0 [11] k0 [12] k0 [13] k0 [14] k0 [15] 1 0x0 0x3  0x1  0x3  0x9  0x3  0x5  0xe  0x4  0x6  0xc  0xc  0x4  0x8  0xf  0x5  0x7  0xd  0xd  0x5  0x9   3 0x0 0x2
0x3 0x2 0x3 0x2 0x3 0x9 0xe 0x6 0x8 0x9 0x8 0x9 0xc 0xf 0x7 0xa 0xb 0xa 0xb 0xd
0x0 0x1 0x8 0x0 0x1 0x0 0x1 0x0 0x1 ∅ 0x4 0x5 0x4 0x2 0x3 0x9 0x2 0x3 0x2 0x3 0x2 0x3 0x6 0x7 0x5 0x8 0x9 0xc 0x8 0x9 0x8 0x9 0x8 0x9 0xc 0xd 0x8 0xa 0xb 0xd 0xa 0xb 0xa 0xb 0xa 0xb 0xe 0xf 0x9 8 0x0 0x0 0x1 0x4 0x5 0x0 0x0 0x1 0x0 0x8 0x4 ∅ 0x2 ∅ ∅ 0x2 0x6 0x4 0x8 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x6 0x7 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x1 0x9 0x5 0x3 0x3 0x7 0x5 0x9 0xe 0x8 0x9 0xc 0xd 0x6 0x8 0x9 0xe 0xc 0xa 0xc 0x4 0xa 0xa 0xe 0xf 0xa 0xb 0xe 0xf 0x7 0xa 0xb 0xf 0xd 0xb 0xd 0x5 0xb 0xb 0xf and since we know that we injected faults on the last 32 bits of W 18 , we know that each nibble of ∆X 19 is either 0x0, 0x1, 0x2 or 0x3. From the difference distribution table of the S-box, we see that an input difference equal to 0x1, 0x2 or 0x3 can lead to an output difference in {0x4, 0x5, 0x6, 0x7, 0x8, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf} only. Consequently, we retrieve k 0 (displayed in red).
Then, Table 11 shows all sets of candidates obtained for each nibble Nib i of L −1 (S(P −1 (C) ⊕ k 0 ) ⊕ P −1 (f 20 (k 1 ))) with i ∈ {0, · · · , 15}, from differentials (∆Y 19 , ∆X 19 ). We again denote by ∅ when the fault does not provide any information about the nibble (i.e. the 16 values are possible).
Finally, by intersecting sets for each nibble, we deduce 8 candidates for k 1 from k 0 and C and we retrieve the correct value of k by testing all. With this we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first practical validation of a DFA against PRIDE, even against any light weight SPN-block cipher.
Note : We observed that injecting 32-bit random faults allows us to have lower complexity than with 16-bit random faults. Indeed, although the differential pairs obtained do not always provide a single candidate in the case of 32-bit faults, the 
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Countermeasures
In this section, we present and briefly analyze three possible countermeasures. This list of countermeasures is not exhaustive and any combination of those three can be used in practice to thwart the DFA proposed in this paper.
Duplication of computations
Description: A simple countermeasure is to make two computations for the last two rounds. We save the state of the cipher W 17 in memory, possibly k times for more security -since we are in lightweight cryptography is seems reasonable to take k = 1 or k = 2. Then we make the computations up to O 20 and save the state again. We repeat the computation with the saved state (W 17 ) and compare with the first result -possibly k times again. If two different computations give different results we trap the cipher and no output is produced by the system. Else the execution performs normally.
Cost: This countermeasure uses, for encryption and decryption, two additional matrix layer and three additional substitution layers, subkey updates and subkey additions. The cost can be bounded from above by 15% of the total PRIDE cost.
Desynchronization
Description: This countermeasure consists in adding time randomization during the cipher so that the temporal position of the 18-th and the 19-th round will not be the same for each execution. For the time randomization generation we can use a simple Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) whose value indicates the 'random' delay time. Those random delay functions can be added before the 18-th round.
Cost: The cost depends on the time randomization generation -a simple LFSR implemented in hardware has a low cost with respect to IoT constraints, it also depends on the duration of the 'random delay' and on the time needed to access the random output of the LFSR.
Masking
Description: Another countermeasure proposed by Guilley and al. in [20] is to add a random mask to the message to prevent two consecutive executions of the same plaintext. More precisely, in its original description, it consists in generating a 64-bit random mask different at each execution, XOR it with the asked plaintext and the ciphertext obtained is sent with the mask.
In our case, we use a simple LFSR defined by a minimal primitive polynomial of degree 64 (X 64 + X 63 + X 61 + X 60 + 1 for example) and by an initialization made public. The LFSR thus generates 2 64 − 1 different masks. It must not be again accessible by the user to prevent its reset. For this, it must be correctly implemented in hardware. We apply the mask by an XOR on the input of the 10-th round. This allows to prevent the adversary to get two encryption of the same plaintext, and therefore to make a DFA. For decryption, we apply an XOR between the mask and the output of the 10-th round and get the correct plaintext. We then have two options. The first is to send the mask with the ciphertext. Unfortunately in this case, this method does not protect against an attack on decryption. Indeed, the attacker can choose the same mask on each decryption. However, in the context of IoT it is common that the card is only used for encryption and decryption is carried out on a protected server. The second is to synchronize the encryption and the decryption. They both use the same LFSR with the same initialization and the decryption must be applied in the same order as ciphertexts received. Therefore, the countermeasure protects both the encryption and the decryption but with an additional synchronisation constraint.
Cost: The cost depends on the choice of the random mask generation. A simple LFSR -like the one we cited -implemented in hardware has a low cost with respect to IoT constraints. Moreover, applying the mask requests an additional cost of an XOR for encryption and the same for decryption in the second case.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose the first differential fault analysis on the block cipher PRIDE. We explain how this attack can be optimized and we demonstrate it, with 4 faults only to retrieve the full secret key. We show that our attack is indeed feasible from 32-bit random faults obtained with electromagnetic injection, which is a low-cost means of injection. We believe that the resistance against DFA is important for a cipher like PRIDE, which is expected to be largely deployed in low-end devices thanks to its lightness. At last we propose some countermeasures which leave the cipher still very efficient for IoT devices. They can be combined to provide more security and are not exhaustive. An optimization of these countermeasures is possible for make them less costly and keep the light side of the cipher. It is also necessary to be careful that the protections to prevent the DFA do not open doors to further attacks. Finally, it appears that our attack applies to any SPN-based block ciphers with a linear layer similar to the one used in PRIDE, like the LS-Designs family introduced by Grosso & al [19] in 2014. The details of this generalization will be studied in a future work.
A Differential properties of the PRIDE S-box
A.1 Difference distribution table of the PRIDE S-box Table 12 shows the difference distribution table T of the PRIDE S-box which is defined by We can see that, from the knowledge of a nonzero input (x ⊕ y) and of an output difference (S(x) ⊕ S(y)) for S we deduce 0, 2 or 4 candidates for the input value x. Moreover, we can easily find pairs of differentials (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) which are satisfied by a single input x. For this, we use Proposition 1 that we prove here.
Proof (of Proposition 1). Let D(a, b) denote the set of solutions of the equation
Let us consider (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) be two differentials with a 1 = a 2 such that
Let us first prove that both D(a 1 , b 1 ) and D(a 2 , b 2 ) have at least 4 elements. If these two sets have two elements only, D(a 1 , b 1 ) = {x, x ⊕ a 1 } and D(a 2 , b 2 ) = {x, x ⊕ a 2 }, implying that they cannot be the same since a 1 = a 2 . Then, at least one of the two sets contains at least four elements. Suppose that #D(a 1 , b 1 ) = 4 and #D(a 2 , b 2 ) = 2. Then, x ⊕ a 2 ∈ D(a 1 , b 1 ), with D(a 2 , b 2 ) = {x, x ⊕ a 2 }. Consequently,
implying that
.
Thus x ⊕ a 1 ∈ D(a 2 , b 2 ), a contradiction. We have proved that #D(a 2 , b 2 ) = 4. Now, it is clear that any element
for some a 4 = 0, we deduce that the four elements x ⊕ a 1 , x ⊕ a 2 , x ⊕ a 1 ⊕ a 4 and x ⊕ a 2 ⊕ a 4 belong to D(a 1 ⊕ a 2 , b 1 ⊕ b 2 ). These four elements are either distinct or satisfy a 4 = a 1 ⊕ a 2 which implies that x ⊕ a 4 ⊕ a 2 = x ⊕ a 1 belongs to D(a 2 , b 2 ), i.e.,
B Other trade-offs between the number of faults and the time complexity
We have shown that 4 faults with an appropriate strategy enable the attacker to recover the whole key. In this section, we evaluate the number of key candidates that an attacker can obtain with fewer faults. This number then corresponds to the time complexity of the complete key recovery. Indeed, if the attacker knows a pair of plaintext-ciphertext, encrypting the known plaintext under each key candidate until the correct ciphertext is recovered leading to a complete key recovery 8 . Firstly, the number of remaining candidates for the subkey k 0 (resp. k 1 ) that an attacker can obtain with one fault on the 19-th round (resp. 18-th round) is 2 32 . We now use this result to estimate the cost of the full key recovery from a few faults only.
With a single fault. We want to determine the cost of the key recovery if the attacker can inject a single fault. If this fault is injected in the 19-th round, then the possible values of k 0 is reduces to a list of 2 32 candidates. This corresponds to a total of 2 96 candidates for the whole 128-bit key. If the attacker knows two plaintext-ciphertext pairs, he can then encrypt the first known plaintext under each of these 2 96 key candidates, until the corresponding ciphertext is recovered. Only 2 96−64 = 2 32 key candidates then remain, and the second plaintext-ciphertext pair can then be exploited for recovering the key. The main part of the time complexity in this attack is the cost of the exhaustive search over the 2 96 candidates, which corresponds to 2 96 encryptions. If the fault is now injected in the 18-th round, then the attack consists in successively examining all 2 64 possible values for k 0 . For each of these 2 64 candidates, the attacker inverts the last encryption round for both the correct and the faulty ciphertexts C and C * . He deduces the value of ∆X 20 , and then of ∆Y 19 . When choosing a random k 0 , ∆X 20 varies in the set of all input differences which can appear when the output difference equals ∆Y 20 . From the difference distribution table of the S-box, the average number of valid input differences corresponding to a fixed output difference is 1 16 ( 19 which are obtained from the partial decryption, only 2 9.6 are valid, implying that only 2 32 values of k 0 need to be considered. For each of these 2 32 values of k 0 , the value of the fault, and then of ∆X 19 provides 2 32 candidates for k 1 as proved in the previous section. This step then leads to a list of 2 64 candidates for the whole 128-bit key, with a time complexity which mainly corresponds to the cost for decrypting one round of PRIDE 2 64 times. The bottleneck of the attack is then the final key recovery procedure, which consists in testing the 2 64 remaining keys on two plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The overall cost of the attack is then roughly the cost of 2 64 encryption.
With two faults. If the two faults are injected in the 18-th round, then the previously described technique which enables the attacker to eliminate some candidates for k 0 is repeated twice. Only a proportion of 2 −64 values of ∆Y 19 will be valid, implying that only the correct value of ∆Y 19 will remain after this step. As previously explained, each value of ∆Y 19 is obtained for 2 22.4 values of k 0 in average. Therefore, this sieving procedure leads to a list of 2 22.4 candidates for k 0 . Now, exploiting the two faults injected in the 18-th round provides one candidate for k 1 . Therefore, we get 2 22.4 candidates for the whole key. The total time complexity of the attack then corresponds to 2 64 decryption of a single round, and to an exhaustive search among the 2 22.4 remaining keys. The first step is then the bottleneck and its cost is less than the cost of 2 64 /20 = 2 59.7 complete encryptions.
If the first fault is now injected in the 19-th round, then the list of possible values for k 0 is first reduced to a list of size 2 32 as explained in the previous section. The second fault, injected on the 18-th round, then enables to reduce this list to 2 32−32 = 1 possible value for k 0 . For this value of k 0 , a list of 2 32 candidates for k 1 is obtained from the second fault. The number of candidates for the whole key, which need to tested, is then 2 32 . The bottleneck of the attack is then the exhaustive search over the 2 32 remaining key candidates, which corresponds to a time complexity equal to the cost of 2 32 encryptions.
With three faults. The best strategy with three faults consists in injecting one fault in the 19-th round, and two in the 18-th round. From the fault in the 19-th round, the attacker gets a list of 2 32 candidates for k 0 . By decrypting the last round under these 2 32 values of k 0 , we roughly get 2 32 pairs of values for ∆Y 19 among which one is expected to be consistent with the two faults injected in the 18-th round. Moreover, these two faults lead to one candidate for k 1 , i.e., one candidate for the whole key. The time complexity of the attack then corresponds to the cost of 2 32 encryptions of a single round, i.e., 2 27.7 full encryptions.
C ARM source code

C.1 L-layer
; L 0 and L 1 ; State s 0 ; Temporary registers t 0 , · · · , t 6 (1) MOV t 0 , #0x00F0 (2) MOVT t 0 , #0xF0F0 (3) AND t 1 , t 0 , s 0 , LSL#4 (4) LSR t 0 , #4 (5) AND t 2 , t 0 , s 0 , LSR#4 (6) AND t 0 , s 0 , #0xFF000000 (7) AND t 3 , s 0 , #0XFF0000 (8) EOR t 1 , t 1 , t 2 (9) AND s 0 , s 0 , #0xFF00 (10) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 1 (11) AND t 1 , s 0 , #0x8000 (12) AND t 2 , s 0 , #0x01 (13) AND t 4 , s 0 , #0xFF00 (14) AND t 5 , s 0 , #0x00FF (15) MOV t 6 , #0xFF000000 (16) AND t 6 , t 6 , s 0 , LSL#8 (17) EOR s 0 , s 0 , r10 (18) AND t 6 , s 0 , #0xFF000000 (19) EOR t 0 , t 0 , t 6 (20) BIC s 0 , s 0 , #0xFF0000 (21) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 0 , LSR#8 (22) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 3 , LSL#8 (23) MOV t 0 , #0xFF00 (24) AND t 0 , t 0 , t 4 , LSL#1 (25) EOR t 0 , t 0 , t 1 , LSR#7 (26) LSR t 3 , t 5 , #1 (27) EOR t 3 , t 3 , t 2 , LSL#7 (28) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 3 , LSL#8 (29) AND t 3 , s 0 , #0xFF00 (30) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 0 (31) EOR s 0 , s 0 , t 3 , LSR#8
; L 2 and L 3 ; State s 1 ; Temporary registers t 0 , · · · , t 5
(1) MOV t 0 , #0xF0F0 (2) MOVT t 0 , #0xF000 (3) AND t 1 , t 0 , s 1 , LSL#4 (4) LSR t 0 , #4 (5) AND t 2 , t 0 , s 1 , LSR#4 (6) AND t 0 , s 1 , #0xFF00 (7) AND t 3 , s 1 , #0X00FF (8) AND s 1 , s 1 , #0xFF0000 (9) EOR t 1 , t 1 , t 2 (10) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 1 (11) AND t 1 , s 1 , #0x80000000 (12) AND t 2 , s 1 , #0x00010000 (13) MOV t 4 , #0xFF000000 (14) AND t 5 , s 1 , t 4 (15) AND t 4 , t 4 , t 5 , LSL#1 (16) EOR t 1 , t 4 , t 1 , LSR#7 (17) MOV t 4 , #0x00FF0000 (18) AND t 5 , s 1 , t 4 (19) AND t 4 , t 4 , t 5 , LSR#1 (20) EOR t 2 , t 4 , t 2 , LSL#7 (21) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 2 , LSL#8 (22) AND t 2 , s 1 , #0xFF000000 (23) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 1 (24) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 2 , LSR#8 (25) AND t 4 , s 1 , #0x00FF (26) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 4 , LSL#8 (27) AND t 4 , s 1 , #0xFF00 (28) EOR t 3 , t 3 , t 4 , LSR#8 (29) EOR t 0 , t 0 , t 3 (30) BIC s 1 , s 1 , #0x00FF (31) EOR s 1 , s 1 , t 0
